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Introduction
The way in which economic developments are studied leaves much to be desired, not just for Britain but also 
for many other countries around the world. In this paper the analytical tools chosen to describe what happens  
to all  citizens in the U.K. are the balance sheet,  income and expenses tools:  the same tools as used by 
companies.  It comes down to what all Brits own and owe and what they earn and spend as well as the  
amounts they save for future spending and the returns over such savings.
What the real economic growth figures measure -in volume changes- is how much the produced quantity of  
goods and services changes from one year to the next. One type of gain or loss, which is included in the GDP 
data, is shown in the current account figures. They represent the difference in what all U.K. households buy 
in goods and services from abroad and how much they sell abroad.
GDP, as a volume output measure, does not tell whether house prices are too high as compared to incomes. It  
also does not tell how homes are financed and what risks such financing methods represent. It does not tell  
whether incomes keep pace with inflation levels. It also does not tell whether the production capacity is too 
high for the demand levels -an output gap- or that demand levels are too low -an income gap. It does not  
show the labour force participation rate, when sometimes job seekers are so disappointed in finding jobs that  
they do no longer register as unemployed. It does not show the number of companies closed in a particular  
year, after struggling to survive in previous years. It does not show the losses banks make on individual,  
company and government  loans or  on other  products  like  payment  protection insurance or  interest  rate 
swaps. It does not show that the Bank of England’s quantitative easing policy has helped to reduce the return  
over U.K. government gilts below inflation levels and simultaneously increase inflation levels. It does not  
show  whether  economic  growth  was  “bought”  through  additional  borrowings  and  what  effect  such 
borrowings will have on disposable incomes in future years. It also does not show that putting additional  
savings into financial assets can sometimes mean that too little of the income generated is used for creating 
demand in the real sector. 
 
The U.K., just like the U.S., is in the fortunate situation that it publishes the statistics on what individual 
households own and owe. By having these published for a number of years one can deduce what individual 
households earn and save and how effective such savings have been in bringing about a financial return and  
a real economic growth return. In the U.S such data are published on a quarterly basis, in the U.K on an 
annual basis.
Only in combining the study of incomes with the use of such incomes can one reach some conclusions on  
what might be done to help improve economic growth in the U.K. and in other countries.
Some proposals have been formulated in this paper. They cover home mortgage lending, which deals with  
the most important fixed asset for nearly all individual households. They deal with economic easing, which 
aims to close the income gap in demand. It also deals with bank restructuring and income generation out of  
government debt. The writer has no illusion that such proposals are exhaustive. There may be many more  
good ideas, hence the term used in the title: “draft”. 
 
The paper hopes to be instrumental in setting off a discussion between all parties involved. Only if all parties  
-the  U.K. government  and opposition parties,  the  Bank of  England,  the banks,  the  company sector,  the 
pension funds and the individual households- are involved, will a solution to this and future crises be found. 
Economies are interdependent and can only be managed effectively through such forms of co-operation.
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1. U.K. Individual Households: Net Worth’ Developments 2002-2011
In the U.K. the Household Net Worth data are collected on an annual basis 1. The latest data available are 
over the year 2011.
Individual households in the U.K owned £4.30 trillion in non-financial assets in 2011 and another £4.28 
trillion in financial assets in 2011. They also owed £1.54 trillion in financial liabilities. This left them with a  
net worth level of £ 7.04 trillion. Taking into account net government debt - national and local council ones-  
individual households owned £6.84 trillion. The difference was mainly the Central Government’s net debt  
position of £763 billion and the local governments’ position of net surplus funds of £504 billion.
The key assets of individual households were dwellings at £4.1 trillion, insurance technical reserves (mainly 
pension funds) of £2.2 trillion and currency and deposits of £1.3 trillion.
The main liabilities were loans of £1.45 trillion, of which £1.25 trillion were mortgage loans and £200 billion 
consumer loans.
Over  the  period 2002-2007 the total  net  worth of  all  individual  households increased by £430.3 billion 
in2003, £431.1 billion in 2004, £475.8 billion in 2005, £504.9 billion in 2006 and £420.9 billion in 2007. In 
2008 the net worth showed a dramatic loss of £841.2 billion, which equalled 58.7% of 2008 nominal GDP. 
In the  years  to  2011 this  loss  has  barely been recuperated,  let  alone that  any growth path was created 
identical to the 2002-2007 net worth improvements.
These gains and losses arise from both produced as well as financial assets. They also reflect the changes in  
borrowing levels as well as the changes in the savings levels out of current incomes. The Household Net  
Worth data provide the clear link between financial actions taken -changes in borrowings and savings- and 
the output produced. The question posed in this paper is:  If it  was possible to achieve net  gains in the  
collective  households’  net  worth  over  the  period  2002-2007 to  the  extent  of  over  £450 billion  a  year, 
combined with real economic growth levels of between 2.6% and 3.1%, why did such gains turn to losses  
over the period 2008-2011?
The U.K. Office of National Statistics did issue a warning that some figures in the data might not be fully  
comparable to previous years. Any error made in this paper in comparing one year to the next is therefore 
unintentional.
In this paper the effects of U.K. government’ savings and borrowings have been excluded, but they will be  
discussed separately.
In the next section attention will be paid to the most important fixed asset individual households can own:  
their homes.
1 http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171778_276513.pdf
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1.1 The U.K. Home Mortgage Market
In table 1 an overview is given of the loan increases -year over previous year-; the home dwellings value  
increases, again year over previous year and the net equity impact on individual households. (Source U.K.  
Individual Households Net Worth data).
Table 1: U.K. Home value changes from year to year, loans’ changes and the net equity effect on 
individual households 2003-2011 in £billion.
Year/
£billion
+/-
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Home
Values
301 352 115 360 381 -388 138 210   28
Loans 113 133  70 124 111    51   -7     7    -2
Equity:
Home 
Values
+/-
Loans
188 219  45 236 270 -432 145 203   30
From the above data it will be clear that the loss in equity of individual households on their homes of £432  
billion in 2008 stopped any increase in mortgage and consumption lending in the following years. The table 
also shows that the equity loss had not been recuperated by the end of 2011 and this is in nominal terms. In 
real terms after taking inflation levels into account, there has been a very sizable loss continuing till to-day.  
Just to put this loss into perspective, it represented 30.1% of nominal GDP in 2008.
In the next section U.K. house prices, housing starts and the level of mortgage approvals will be highlighted.
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1.1.1 House price developments, Housing starts and Mortgage approval levels.
Lloyds Bank’s subsidiary Halifax2 has published a summary table of house price developments over the key 
two periods: Q2 2002 till Q2 2007 and Q2 2007 till Q2 2012, which is reproduced below in table 2.
Table 2: UK house prices by property type, 2002-2012 (Source: Halifax)
Property
Type
    Q2
2002(£)
  Q2
2007(£)
  Q2
2012(£)
5   year  % 
change
2002/07
5 year %
Change
2007/12
10 year %
Change
Terraced 107,327 209,917 151,568
                     
96% -28% 41%
Bungalows 135,757 229,520 185,365 69% -19% 37%
Semi-
detached 120,728 216,872 165,565 80% -24% 37%
Detached 205,224 359,497 282,211 75% -21% 38%
Flat 130,248 215,439 161,663 65% -25% 24%
All 
Properties 137,273 241,838 179,170 76% -26% 31%
In Great Britain there are three groups of home builders:  local authorities,  housing associations and the  
private sector. Over the last 10 years local authorities new housing starts were always less than 2% of the 
total housing starts and often even less significant. Housing associations housing starts varied between 10% 
and 22% of the total new housing starts, whereby one should note the actual number of their housing starts  
did not vary very much over the last eight years with an actual number of starts between 24,000 and 29,000,  
but that the variations were in the number of private sector housing starts.
In table 3 the housing starts3 are provided from 2002-2011 
 
Table 3: Great Britain annual new housing starts 2002-2011
Year/
Housing
starts 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Housing
Associations
•
18,500 19,620 24,230 26,190 26,420 29,460 29,060 25,580 27,630 25,190
Private 
sector 163,700 175,480 189,090 182,730 181,970 185,640 97,550 73,190 93,110 102,240
All 
dwellings
182,390 195,400 213,520 209,120 208,730 215,670 127,140 99,350 123,210 129,840
2 http://www.lloydsbankinggroup.com/media/pdfs/halifax/2012/2909_detached.pdf
3 http://www.statistics.gov.uk/hub/people-places/housing-and-households/housing-stock
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The demand and supply side of the housing markets have been diverging for a while now. New households’  
formation indicates a need for new dwellings to the extent of some 233,000 per year 4. There is already a 
substantial backlog in building homes for individual households.
The need for new dwellings is clear. Supply, demand and the price mechanism do not seem to get the market  
moving in the desired direction. The main cause is that the supply is driven by demand, but demand is not  
driven by supply but by individual households’ income and home equity levels. The situation has been made 
worse in that a higher level of supply was not accompanied by house price drops but by steep price rises. In  
the period 2008-2011 the lower level of supply was not followed by an increase in home prices, but by a  
decrease.  In the period 2008-2011 on average 120,000 dwellings were started up, compared to 210,000 in 
the period 2004-2007. The new housing starts were 360,000 lower in the more recent period than in the  
earlier period. The average home price reached its peak by the end of the second quarter 2007 at £241,838 
and reached rock bottom at the end of the first quarter 2009 at £166,881, a drop of 31% in seven quarters.  
The latest data from the Halifax indicate that at the end of the fourth quarter 2012 average home prices for  
the U.K. had increased somewhat to £176,381.
Table 4 shows the level of new home mortgages approval5, whereby it should be understood that mortgages 
are  taken  out  for  a  number  of  reasons:  (1)  swapping  more  expensive  mortgages  to  lower  interest  rate 
mortgages; especially coming off from fixed rate mortgages and entering into variable rate mortgages and 
the other way around- interest rate arbitrage-; (2) trading up on the property ladder; (3) borrowing for home 
improvements; and (4) borrowing for general consumption purposes. The latter can be done during working 
life but also after retirement through equity release schemes.
 
Table 4: New Home Mortgage Approvals 2003-2012
Year
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Mortg.
Appr.
x 000 1,377 1,130 1,197 1,429 1,152  598 578 543 591 613
In December 2011, the U.K. Financial Services Authority (FSA) published a very detailed study6 of the U.K. 
mortgage markets and its various aspects. Some salient points are:
• In 2010 there were 26 million households in the U.K. who owned £7,045 billion together, or on  
average £270.960 per household. Dwellings accounted for £155.250 on average, before mortgage 
debt. Financial assets represented £165.460 per households, of which currency and deposits £46.690, 
shares £25.330 and insurance reserves, including pension reserves, £85.600.
• 68% of all  households owned their own property in the U.K.; 32% were outright owners or 8.3 
million households; 36% had a first  charge mortgage or 9.36 million households and 32% were 
private or social tenants; again 8.3 million households.
• The 9.36 million owner-occupier households plus the 1.74 million owner-tenant households had a 
collective  mortgage  debt  of  £1,250  billion,  which  equates  to  some  £112.600  per  individual 
household. Per end 2010 net average equity for all mortgage holders was 27.5%. For all individual 
4 http://www.york.ac.uk/res/ukhr/ukhr1112/UKHRbriefing2012.pdf
5 http://www.housepricecrash.co.uk/graphs-mortgage-approvals.php
6 http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/pubs/cp/mmr-datapack2011.pdf
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households together it was 64.2% per same date.  All households had a total consumer debt of £198 
billion or £7.615 per household on average.
• The FSA study indicates that the number of households owning property has not increased over the 
last few years due to some income related and to some demographic facts. The first one is that the  
first time buyers -mainly younger ones- have found it harder to raise the down payment to obtain a  
mortgage and the second one is that older households have mostly paid off their mortgage and if 
anything they move down the property ladder in order to release some cash.
• The study also analyses the lending structure which most likely has contributed to the rise in house  
prices.  Such  price  rises  exceeded  the  growth  in  income  levels.  The  FSA  contributes  these 
developments to the deterioration in lending standards, which not only happened in the U.K., but  
also in the U.S., Ireland and Spain for instance. Such practices were originated by lenders -to some  
extent  non-bank  lenders-  which  took  mortgage  risks  on  individual  households  which  could  be 
classified as high risk borrowers. Sometimes mortgage brokers were capable to arrange deals for  
such borrowers and there were specialised subsidiaries of the banks and building societies dealing  
with these kinds of clients. Self certification of income levels was widely practiced. Interest only 
mortgages were encouraged, so much so that 43% of current mortgages are interest only mortgages.  
Sometimes, like in the case of Northern Rock, the loan to home value ratio exceeded 100%. For 
some Northern Rock mortgages it was raised to 125%. In 2010 38% of the mortgages were fixed rate 
mortgages and 62% were on variable rates.
• Another important point made in the FSA study is the reason that some individual households find it 
hard  to  keep  up  with  their  home  mortgage  payments.  Adverse  life  events  were  mentioned  by 
individual households as the reason that these households had difficulties in paying back outstanding 
debt. 32% explained that unemployment was the reason, 26% quoted relationship break-downs, 15% 
serious ill health/accidents, 11% care for children and 7% partner’s health or accident.
• The FSA also pays  attention to  the  fact  that  mortgages  represent  the  least  costly loan type  for  
individual households and that many households have used (re)mortgaging as a way to pay for home 
improvements or for other types of expenditure.
• The doubtful debtor experience in the U.K. on home mortgages fluctuates around 2%. This is mainly 
due to forbearance by the U.K. lenders. They have converted many home loans which experienced  
repayment problems into interest only loans. In the U.S. due to the extensive use of securitisation of  
home  mortgages,  the  level  of  home  repossessions  has  been  much  greater  relative  to  the  U.K. 
Northern  Rock,  before  it  was  nationalised,  had  made  extensive  use of  such  securitised funding 
structures.
Some observations need to be made regarding the FSA findings. The average price of homes in the U.K.  
from £ 137,273 in Q2 2002 to £179,170 in Q2 2012 reflects a nominal price development. If one corrects 
these prices on basis of U.K inflation levels over this period, than the conclusion is that over this decade 
nothing extraordinary has happened: house prices have just kept up with U.K. inflation levels and nothing 
more than that. Of course the period of 2002-2007 showed rapid value changes, but the correction has taken 
place over the period 2007-2012. A study based on Nationwide’ house prices from 1975 till Q3 20127 asserts 
that current house prices are already well below the trend price by a margin of 12.9%.
If house prices are no longer over-valued could it be that income growth and net home equity growth have 
something to do with the poor state of the housing market, apart from the banks being more cautious?
7 http://www.housepricecrash.co.uk/indices-nationwide-national-inflation.php
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1.2 Households’ income developments and home equity stakes.
The Institute of Fiscal Studies has made a study8 about the living standards, poverty and inequality in the 
U.K. Some key findings were:
• There were sharp falls in average household incomes in the U.K. in fiscal year 2010-2011. Median 
income fell by 3.1% from £432 per week to £419 per week (both in 2010-2011 prices) and mean 
household income fell by 5.7%, from £542 to £511 per week. This represents the largest one year  
fall in median income since 1981 and the largest one-year fall in mean income since IFS’s consistent  
data began in 1962. Using either measure, this leaves average living standards in the U.K. below the  
level in 2004-05, undoing five years of (slow) growth in a single year.
• The primary reason for the falls in average income in 2010-11 was the fall  in earnings. Pre-tax  
earnings fell by 7.1% in real terms in 2010-11, mostly due to the falls in the real earnings of those 
employed as opposed to a fall in the numbers employed. From 2008-10 real average incomes still  
grew, based on a relatively stable real employment income and strong real-terms growth in income 
from state benefits and tax credits. In 2010-11 medium incomes before taxes and benefits was 7.8% 
lower than its 2007-08 peak.
• The IFS asserts  that  there are good reasons to be pessimistic about  the prospects for the living  
standards beyond 2010-11. In 2011-12, employment fell slightly and average earnings fell in real 
terms. The Office for Budget Responsibility expects real year-on -year growth in average earnings to 
remain negative or negligible up to and including 2012-13. Net tax rises and cuts to benefits will put  
further downward pressure on household incomes. If IFS forecasts are realised than this trend in  
negative changes in median income would represent the worst period for changes in median income 
since at least the early 1960’s, and probably much earlier.
A drop in  real  income  is  bad enough,  but  individual  households  can make  it  worse  by changing their 
collective savings behaviour. They have done so by turning home equity into consumption in the period 
2003-2007 and started adding equity out of reduced incomes over the period 2008-2012. During the latter  
period banks became more cautious in their mortgage lending behaviour as evidenced by the substantial drop  
in new home mortgages granted, but new homes were still being built, so the total value of all homes did go 
up due to the home additions. If -as an approximate figure- one multiplies the number of new housing starts  
with the average U.K. home price per end of the years 2008-2011 -the price according to the Halifax data-, 
than the increase in home values would be for 2008: £21.0 billion, for 2009 £16.6 billion, for 2010 £20.2  
billion and for 2011 £21.0 billion. This leads to a total value increase in home values of £78.8 billion over  
the four years 2008-11. As the total outstanding level of loans was absolutely stagnant from 2008 to 2011 at  
£1.446 trillion according the net worth statement of U.K. households, this implies that collectively such 
property acquisitions were not financed by loans or price fluctuations but by equity injections, in other words 
collectively individual households saved £78.8 billion out of declining incomes. The average nominal price 
of homes over the period 2008-2011 fluctuated very little, so the real equity injection came out of cash  
incomes, rather than out of property price value increases.
Table 1 provides the net equity changes in home equity values of all U.K. individual households over the 
period 2003-2011. Such a net equity change is caused by four factors: the value increases due to new home  
building; the changes in home prices, the changes in borrowing levels, but also the changes in home equity  
withdrawal levels to boost current consumption. In the section above it was calculated that over the period  
2008-2011 individual households collectively saved £78.8 billion out of declining incomes to support their 
home equity position. Over 2003-2007 the reverse process took place. Equity withdrawals took place out of  
rising house values. These equity withdrawals can be estimated by multiplying the dwellings value as per 
8 http://www.ifs.org.uk/publications/6196
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year end 2002 with the average home price increase over 2003, which was 16.13% which leads to dwellings  
value of £2,983 billion as per the end of 2003. The actual values according to the ONS Net worth statement 
were £2,869.0 billion. The difference is £114 billion. Correct the latter amount for the new home values 
created in 2003 by multiplying new housing starts with the average house price per year end 2003, which 
equals £27.5 billion, and the remainder is the equity withdrawal amount of £86.5 billion. One cannot assess 
how much of such withdrawal was used for additional consumption in 2003, but the value of the equity 
withdrawal is very relevant.  In 2003 this equity withdrawal was 7.59% of 2003 GDP (nominal value of  
£1,139.4 billion). Similar calculations for 2004 lead to a £94.6 billion equity withdrawal. For 2005 the figure 
was  £24.7  billion.  For  2006  the  figure  was  an  equity  injection  of  £16.8  billion.  For  2007  the  equity 
withdrawal was £ 125.2 billion, which represented 8.9% of 2007 GDP.
In the U.K., the owners’ equity as a percentage of household real estate is not calculated in the Households’ 
net  worth  by  asset  and  year  statistics,  unlike  in  the  U.S  Balance  Sheet  of  Households  and  Nonprofit  
Organizations9. However one can deduce from the available U.K. data that new housing starts from 2008 till 
2011 have not led to an increased level of outstanding home loans. This means that individual households  
have repaid home mortgages and saved more to an extent of about £78.8 billion for the four year period 2008 
to 2011. At the same time they have not entered into more home mortgage loans to reach the volume level of  
210,000 new dwellings. This represents another loss in spending of £59.5 billion on new homes over the 
same period 2008-11.  The actions of saving more  from declining income levels and borrowing less for  
fewer new homes  represents a triple whammy to the economy.
In the U.S the turn around from increasing to lower levels in outstanding mortgages went even further than in 
the U.K. In the U.S. individual households reduced their home mortgage level by about $1 trillion in the 
period 2008 to Q3 2012.This represented about 10% of all outstanding home mortgages. The pressure of  
selling off “repossessed homes” was also much stronger than in the U.K. In the U.S. 5.35 million second  
hand homes were brought into the housing market since 2006. This should be compared to the housing need  
of about 1.6 million new homes per annum in the States. Americans changed their savings and borrowing  
patterns even more so than in the U.K., but the impact was somewhat smaller than in the U.K with a loss of  
4.4% of GDP. In my paper: People’s Power: The Power of Money10 which is available via IDEAS of the Fed 
in St.Louis, I have analysed the U.S. housing market and the U.S. losses made since 2005.
 
So far the analysis of the developments around the most important asset of individual households in Britain: 
homes.  Suggestions  for  an  improved  flow  of  funds  to  individual  households  for  such  homes  will  be  
discussed in section 5.2.1
2 Banks in the United Kingdom
Banking activities have a relatively large share of GDP in the U.K. compared to other countries. In this paper  
the focus will be on the domestic activities of the banks and non-banks. The latter can be defined as lenders,  
which have their funding provided by the wholesale money and capital markets, rather than by their own 
depositors.
Many banks in the U.K., especially in the City of London are involved in cross-border activities, either as 
currency traders, bond and share traders and/or as risk traders in the derivatives markets. Of course losses are  
being made as well as gains. Such losses affect the (individual) shareholders or their representatives -pension 
funds and life insurance companies-, which may also be some U.K. ones. For the purpose of this paper the 
focus will not be on cross border activities, but purely on U.K. domestic ones.
The key element, which sets banks apart from ordinary companies, is that those banks and other non-bank  
lenders take risks on the future cash flows -incomes- of individual households, companies and the U.K.  
government. Banks enter into risk contracts, either formally in loan agreements or informally in buying up 
9 http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/z1r-5.pdf
10 http://ideas.repec.org/p/pra/mprapa/43735.html
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share, bond and derivative risks. The legal side might be well covered, notwithstanding that currently many 
successful  claims  against  the  banking  sector  have  been  made  for  misselling  practices  about  payment 
protection insurance, interest rate swaps, and about fixing the Libor rates. 
It is however the risks that banks run on the economic side of the equation. Banks -contrary to companies-  
cannot reduce their “costs” of production for the products they sell: risk products. They cannot reduce the  
reward to the depositors below the market level, otherwise they lose deposits. Banks’ input costs are fixed  
and their output income is depending on their own risk selection, but also on the state of an economy, in 
other words variable. Companies can adjust their input costs if sales do not materialise. Banks sell products  
which cannot be terminated during the contract period and such products may turn out to be loss making 
quite a long way into the future.
2.1. U.K. banks and Non-banks and the mortgage markets
In section 1 the developments of the mortgage markets have already been extensively discussed. In this  
section attention is  being drawn to the well-known fact  of  maturity mismatches.  The mortgage product  
requires a risk commitment from one bank, non-bank or another for nearly always 25 years or longer. Banks  
and building societies in the U.K., as elsewhere, do not have funds available which are committed for 25 
years, not even their own equity resources as recent banking losses have shown. Individual households are 
generally unable to repay their  mortgages any faster.  At the moment  only Manchester  Building Society 
offers a 25 year fixed rate mortgage in the U.K.
What banks and building societies have done is to restrict fixed rates to 2, 5 and 10 year loans and the  
remainder is based on their short term costs of funds. These are Standard Variable Rate mortgages or some 
variations with lower discounted rates plus higher subsequent ones. 
The risks on home mortgages triple through the SVR method:
1. The individual household is exposed to an interest rate risk, which in the current interest rate climate can 
only mean one thing: interest rates will move up and with it the difficulty of maintaining mortgage payments.  
As 43% of all U.K. mortgages are already interest only mortgages and 68% are mortgages on an SVR basis,  
this risk is quite substantial. If it is a risk to a household, then it is also a risk to the lender and to the wider  
society as well, through reduced disposable incomes.
2. Apart from the very sizeable risk of interest rate movements, there are also the maturity mismatch risks for 
all mortgage lenders, which may mean that in future some lenders will no longer be rescued by the taxpayers  
if they get into funding difficulties.
3. The process of mortgage securitisation leads to additional risks for all concerned. The experience of the  
U.S. has been that such securitisation has removed the funding risks from the originating lenders to third 
parties.  In doing so the link between risk monitoring by the lender on the income developments  of the 
borrower becomes less relevant for the lender as such risks have been sold on. Secondly a 25 year risk  
commitment becomes subject to daily market fluctuations. In case a portfolio of mortgages does no longer  
perform, the new funders will not want to provide the option of forbearance. They will want to liquidate the  
outstanding loans as soon as possible by selling off the underlying assets: the homes. What should be a 25 
year income based’ risk, becomes an instant asset based liquidation process. This harms all home owners,  
including those who had no part  in  the  securitisation process.  Individual  households  were never  asked, 
whether they approved of such risk transfer. Home owners, who owned their homes outright, were also never  
asked, notwithstanding that the home sales program affected their net worth substantially. In the U.K. in 
2008 a Deutsche Bank study11 assessed that about £155 billion was raised in U.K. mortgage Master Trust  
Structures. This represented a funding level of about 12.5% of all mortgage lending in 2008.
11 http://www.globalsecuritisation.com/08_GBP/GBP_GSSF08_161_166_DB_UK_Mort.pdf
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2.2 U.K. banks and the company sector
The risks  banks  run  on  lending  to  companies  can  best  be  described  as  a  company  specific  risk  and a 
collective economic risk of no or slow growth. Banks, in their lending to companies, are supposed to take  
both  risks  into  account  when  granting  banking  facilities.  Table  5  provides  an  overview  of  company 
bankruptcies since 200212.
Table  5:  Company  bankruptcies  in  England  and  Wales  from  2002-2012  (source:  Department  of 
Business, Innovation and Skills)
Year Total Compulsory
Liquidations
Creditors Voluntary
Liquidations
2002 16,307 6,231 10,076
2003 14,184 5,234  8,960
2004 12,192 4,584  7,608
2005 12,893 5,233  7,660
2006 13,137 5,418  7,719
2007 12,507 5,165  7,342
2008 15,635 5,494 10,041
2009 19,077 5,643 13,434
2010 16,045 4,792 11,253
2011 16,886 5,003 11,883
2012 16,138 4,243 11,895
A conclusion which can be drawn out of above figures is that these liquidation numbers closely follow the  
ups and downs of economic growth figures in real terms. This is not at all surprising as businesses depend on  
turnover to create cash flows. Liquidations are a lagging indicator of economic growth; they follow the 
growth pattern rather  than leading it.  What  above table also makes  clear  is  how bank risks are closely 
correlated with economic growth patterns. When companies go bankrupt, it usually also means substantial  
write-offs on loans to these companies: an economic loss. In the years of higher economic growth a lower 
number of companies go down, and in slow or no growth years a higher number go down. For banks it is  
their business to lend to companies; in many cases the bank losses incurred are mainly due to the incorrect  
assessment of demand levels in an economy. Sometimes it is due to venture capital companies increasing the 
gearing ratio of companies.
12 http://www.insolvencydirect.bis.gov.uk/otherinformation/statistics/201211/table1.pdf
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3 The U.K. economy, government and the Bank of England
3.1 The U.K. government as a borrower
The U.K. government, just like many other governments in the world, has been unable to match its tax 
revenues with its expenditure levels.  It  therefore has resorted to borrowing to close the gap between its  
expenditures and its taxes raised.
Table 6 shows the outstanding net government debt level from fiscal year 2005 to 2013.
Table 6: U.K. government net debt level outstanding end of fiscal year 2005-2013
Fiscal
Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Net
Outstanding
Debt
x£ billion
 424  463  500 525 617 760 905 1.039  e 1.159  e
This net debt does not take into account the amounts pledged for rescuing Royal  Bank of Scotland and 
Lloyds Bank after its takeover of Halifax/Bank of Scotland.
When individual  households  lose  £432 billion in  net  home equity levels in  a  single  year  -2008-;  when 
company bankruptcies increase by 25% in the same year; when banks need to be rescued also in the same  
year and when unemployment levels go up, it should come as no surprise that tax revenues could not keep up 
with government expenditure levels.
What is important is that the period of impact of such losses should be kept to a minimum, in order not to 
burden  future  generations  with  the  creation  of  continuing  government  deficits.  What  government  debt 
funding does is  similar  to an individual  household taking out  a consumer loan:  it  increases the amount  
available in the current period to keep spending on goods and services -the credit extension- only to be faced  
by a reduction in disposable income in future years when debt has to be repaid -the credit contraction period-
The increased level of net debt outstanding, doubling in the period 2008-2012, makes an economic growth 
strategy all the more urgent. Such growth should come from the individual households and from the private  
sector rather than from increasing government borrowing any further. After all, the people who are going to  
be asked to pay back government debt are the individual households.
3.2 The Bank of England
There are two interest rates which are key to the U.K’s. economy: the first one is the base rate, the short term 
rate and the second one is the implied yield on the ten year gilts. What is important is how they compare to  
the annual inflation rate. Table 7 shows these data for the period 2002-2012.
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Table 7: Annual mean yield on 10 year gilts13; base rates and RPI inflation rates 2002-2012
Year/
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
10yr
Gilts
Yield%
4.98 4.62 4.96 4.53 4.60 5.15 4.65 3.88 3.75 3.25 1.98
Base
Rate%
4.0 3.7 4.4 4.7 4.6 5.5 4.7 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5
RPI
%
1.7 2.9 3.0 2.8 3.2 4.3 4.0 -0.5 4.6 5.2 3.1
A well known fact is that the Bank of England decided to launch its “Quantitative Easing” Programme in 
2009. Since then it has bought £375 billion in mainly gilts to increase the supply of funds to the financial  
markets in order to stimulate demand. What table 7 shows is that from 2009 onwards inflation levels have 
outstripped the 10 year gilt yield by a sizeable margin of 85 basis points in 2010, 1.95% in 2011 and 1.12% 
in  2012.  This  is  totally  contrary  to  the  period  2002-2008  when  a  positive  margin  over  inflation  was 
maintained for the U.K. 10 year gilts.
Three points need to be raised about this QE policy decision:
1. The net equity position of individual households in their homes dropped by £432 billion in 2008 and in 
total by £841 billion in the same year. How could such a drop in equity, support an increase in borrowing 
levels? Individual households did not think so and they increased their equity stake in their homes by £78.8 
billion over the period 2008-2011. Individual households also saw their incomes reduced by higher inflation 
levels than their average wage and salary increases.
2. Companies -especially the larger ones- did not want to borrow more either. They reacted to the lower  
spending levels of individual households. Some larger companies also accumulated substantial cash reserves.  
Due to the recession an increased number of companies went bankrupt, not because of lack of credit, but  
because of lack in demand.
3. Banks benefitted from the lowered yields on their existing gilt portfolios, making capital gains. However  
this effect was outdone by bank bail-outs and individual and company insolvency levels. The latter reduced 
their equity base, so that that they were also in no position to lend. Also the misselling of ppi and interest rate  
swaps and regulatory fines took their toll on bank capital ratios.
The individual  households,  the companies  and the banks could not  accommodate  increased lending and 
borrowing levels, so why was the concept of QE applied? The real effect was on government borrowing 
costs. However this has two aspects. Firstly the taxpayers -the individual households- are responsible for 
paying back government debt in future. Spending to-day and charging taxpayers’ to-morrow has the same  
effect as a consumer bank loan. It increases the purchasing power in the current period but reduces it in  
future. If, as currently, the debt grows rapidly, the future will look less bright for real disposable income 
growth. The second aspect is the income level over debt. Manipulating the income level through QE, lowers 
the current income for gilt holders below inflation levels: the savers lose. What is the benefit of such action?  
Was it to punish savers and encourage borrowers?
The real  consideration should have been that  current  incomes  are  strongly under  pressures  for  all  non-  
government households and that a positive reward for savers would have added some income to the non-
13 http://www.tradingeconomics.com/united-kingdom/government-bond-yield
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government sector to give them more leeway to spend more to-day rather than see the debt accumulate at a  
slightly slower pace.
3.3 Employment and Unemployment in the U.K.
In table 8 the time series about the number of people employed, the number of unemployed, the labour force 
participation rate and the level of unemployment have been included for the period 2002-201214. The labour 
force participation rate is defined as the percentage of the total labour force in the particular age group (16-
64) who are either employed or unemployed or not actively seeking employment.
Table 8: Employment, Unemployment in numbers and as a percentage of the labour force 2002-2012 
(Source: Office of National Statistics)
Year
Employment
X 1,000
%  of
Labour force
Unemployment
X 1,000
% of
Labour force
2002 27.920 72.7 1.529 5.2
2003 28.182 72.8 1.490 5.0
2004 28.480 72.9 1.426 4.8
2005 28.770 72.7 1.467 4.9
2006 29.025 72.8 1.674 5.4
2007 29.228 72.2 1.654 5.3
2008 29.440 72.6 1.783 5.7
2009 28.960 70.9 2.394 7.7
2010 29.035 70.5 2.479 7.8
2011 29.176 70.5 2.560 8.1
2012 29.681 71.4 2.490 7.7
The gains and losses on the potential income levels can be deduced from the number of people employed and 
from the percentage of the labour force in work. If 72.8% is taken as the bench mark of what the U.K.  
economy  is  capable  of  delivering,  then  -as  an  example-  in  2009  this  72.8%  would  have  taken  the  
employment level to 29,736 million. As the actual level was 28,960 million there was a loss in income for 
776 000 people. If one takes the average nominal income in 2009 of 23,140 15 (Source: Office of National 
Statistics) and multiplies this with the 776 000 than the loss for 2009 was £17.95 billion which was 1.28% of  
GDP in 2009. This income loss is multiplied through the economy by lower demand levels, the sharply  
increased level of  company insolvencies in 2009 and the fact  that  the U.K. government had to pay out  
unemployment benefits for an additional  600 000 persons.. The loss is also a multi year loss as up to now  
the labour force participation ratio has not returned to 72.8%.
14 http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171766_292921.pdf
15 http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/datasets-and-tables/index.html?
pageSize=50&sortBy=none&sortDirection=none&newquery=average+weekly+earnings+2009&content-
type=Reference+table&content-type=Dataset
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3.4 Balance of Payments: Current Account Balance
The U.K. has for many years  run a deficit  on its current account of its balance of payments.  The trade 
balance has shown a deficit for many years ever since 1997, the last year that a surplus was recorded. The  
services sector has shown a surplus for many years, but together there has been a current account deficit for  
at least the last decade. IMF data16 show the current account deficit for the last nine years.
Table 9: Current Account Deficit in percentage and actual £ billion, 2004-2012
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Deficit
% GDP -2.1% -2.6% -3.2% -2.5% -1.4% -1.5% -3.3% -1.9% -1.7%
GDP
x £ bln 1,202.4 1,254.3 1,328,6 1,405.8 1,433.9 1,393.9 1,463.7 1,507.6 1,548.3
Current
Account
Deficit
x £ bln
    25.3     32.6     42.5     35.1
    
    20.1     13.9     48.3
   
 
    28.6     26.3
4. Summary of Losses
4.1 Net Worth Losses for Individual Households in the U.K.
In 2008 the  net  worth  of  individual  households  dropped by £841.2  billion.  This  drop was  evenly split 
between total non-financial assets and financial assets with a small change in financial liabilities. However  
the loss was bigger in that it was a turn around from about £ 450 billion gain on average in the previous years  
to a loss of £ 840 billion: a swing of £1.29 trillion or nearly 90% of 2008 GDP. It is this loss and the reasons 
for  this  loss  as  well  as  the  slow recovery in  the  subsequent  years  which should be at  the  heart  of  the  
economic analysis. How could it happen and how can such losses be avoided?
4.2 Job Losses.
Over the last four years, jobs in the U.K economy did not grow as fast as to employ 72.8% of the labour 
force. This led to income losses in these years. In the above, in section 3.3, the specific loss for 2009 was  
calculated as £17.95 billion. For 2010 and subsequent years the losses continued. If the active labour force  
remains underutilised, such income losses accumulate as do the effects. One effect is that the government has  
to pay out larger sums of unemployment benefits and thereby increases its budget deficit. Loans by the U.K. 
government have to be paid back in future years, so that tax rates will ultimately have to go up to pay back 
these benefits. This government expenditure represents a second type of loss to individual households. If not  
enough jobs are created also the demand levels in the U.K. economy will  be less and companies suffer  
underutilisation losses: A third type of loss.
4.3 Wages and salaries increases below inflation levels
16 http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2012/01/pdf/statapp.pdf
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For the average wage and salary earner the increases in their employment incomes have not kept pace with  
inflation levels (RPI as this include mortgage interest rates) since early 2008 and up to currently17. Such slow 
income growth prevents  individual  households  from keeping their  savings percentage at  a  steady level.  
Individual households become relatively poorer. This again represents a loss to them and does not create a  
good base to expand borrowings or increase consumption levels. For instance RPI in 2010 was 4.6%; the  
mean gross income was £26,564 in 2010 compared to £26,450 in 2009. The latter increase was 0.43%. If the 
increase had been 4.6% than the mean gross income would have been £27,667, a loss per employed person 
of £1,103 or for all 29 350 000 employed persons a loss of £ 32.1 billion in income. This loss represented  
2.2% of 2010 GDP. This loss has only been calculated on the basis that wages increases are kept in line with 
RPI inflation level changes. It is noteworthy that before 2008, wages adjustments exceeded RPI levels.
4.4 Current Account Losses
Current account losses are reflected in GDP levels. However the U.K. position does not compare well with  
strongly export oriented countries like Germany, Holland and a few other countries which have maintained 
their current account surpluses even in the current difficult years. For the U.K., this represents on average a  
loss of some £25 to £35 billion per annum.
4.5 Company losses
Companies experience an output gap if they produce less than they are capable of producing. The Office for  
Budget Responsibility has calculated18 that the U.K. output gap for 2009 was -4% and for the second and 
third quarter 2010 respectively -3.5% and -3.25%. Such output gaps make it harder for companies to make 
profits. Companies will also experience a higher level of company bankruptcies. Over the period 2002-2007 
the average level was 13 537 company closures per annum. In 2009 the level reached 19 077 or 41% over the 
2002-2007 period average. Even in 2012, the company closures number of 16 138 was still 19.2% over the 
average 2002-2007 level. Company closures reduce bank profits, reduce company tax levels and of course  
limit the number of jobs available. Underutilisation of capacity and company closures also lead to share  
value losses. This means: losses all around.
4.6 Bank losses
One has only to follow bank share prices since 2008 to see the extent of the losses made by the banks. 
However, as stated before, banks take risks on expected income flows of their customer base. If due to  
economic changes such income growth is not forthcoming, banks will experience a much higher level of 
losses. Risk acceptance on their clients is a bank job; economic risk’ avoidance is a bank plus the collective  
society job.
4.7 Pension fund losses
Pension funds reflect the true value development in financial assets. They reflect savings for use in later  
periods. For instance in 2008 U.K. pension funds and life insurance companies lost 14.2% of their values.  
The actual loss on financial investments was larger as new pension fund contributions and life insurance 
premiums  were  coming  in.  What  seems  often  forgotten  is  that  these  savings  belong  to  the  individual 
households. They do not belong to the government,  neither to the companies who manage them.  In the 
statistics on Households Total Net Worth Data, they are properly identified as individual households’ assets.
5. A Draft Economic Master Plan for the U.K.
17http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2009/mar/09/inflation-economics 
18 http://budgetresponsibility.independent.gov.uk/wordpress/docs/briefing%20paper%20No2%20FINAL.pdf
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5.1 Introduction
A draft master plan needs to be based on two concepts:
1 Reduce income risks to all households and 
2 Use existing savings more efficiently.
All in all the proposals set out below fall in either category. It is not claimed here that the proposals are  
exhaustive and that there may not be other ways to help the economy grow. What the proposals hope to do is  
to start up a serious discussion on not just on what the U.K. government can do, or the Bank of England, or 
the banks, or the company sector, or the pension funds or the individual households for that matter, but what  
all these parties can do collectively.
5.2 Reduce income risks to individual households
5.2.1 Income risks linked to home mortgages
The income risks related to home mortgages are reflected in the facts that:
• 43% of all mortgages are interest rate only mortgages and 68% are standard variable rate mortgages.  
Also the fixed rate mortgages are generally of a short duration and not in line with the capacity of 
individual households to repay such mortgages in any period less than 25 years.
• Home ownership levels are dropping and are currently at 65.3% of households against 70.9% in  
2003.  This  clearly reflects  the  situation  that  many  first  time  buyers  are  unable  to  get  onto  the 
property ladder. Secondly the growth in average wages has been below inflation levels from 2008 
onwards and unemployment rates have gone up since 2008.
• Current interest rates are at an all time low, which means that the chances of interest rate increases 
are more than likely in the near future.
U.K. commercial banks and building societies cannot offer 30 year fixed rate mortgages. They also cannot  
accept high loan to value ratios of 90 or 95% of home values, which are especially important for first time  
buyers.  As the experience of payment  protection insurance has shown, banks individually cannot  easily 
insure against adverse life events, such as unemployment, relationship break downs and serious illness or  
accidents.  However  collectively  such  life  events  impair  the  servicing  of  the  mortgage  debt  of  some 
individual households, either temporarily or permanently; some form of insurance would reduce the risks for  
the banks in their lending decisions.
On basis of these considerations my proposal is to set up a national mortgage bank and a national mortgage  
insurance company.
Proposal 1: To set up a National Mortgage Bank (NMB) and a National Mortgage Insurance
                     Company (NMI)
In the United States 30 year mortgages are the standard rather than the exception. Of all new mortgages  
granted in 2012 95% of these mortgages have an involvement of either Fannie Mae or Freddy Mac. Their  
January 2013 interest offer on a 30 year fixed rate mortgage was 3.41% per annum. This percentage includes 
the risk premium for good clients.
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The proposal for the U.K. is to set up a State sponsored enterprise (NMB) along somewhat similar lines as  
Fannie Mae or Freddy Mac.
Its aim is to help individual households, especially the low and medium income households, to buy their own 
homes or move from smaller to larger accommodations when households’ needs change. Its aim is also to 
protect individual households -and as a consequence the economy- against interest rate rises, which were not  
foreseen at the time of taking out the mortgage.
Variant 1: Shared Risks between NMB and the banks and building societies
NMB would be providing the long term funds for a home acquisition to an individual household in an  
indirect manner, via the commercial banks and building societies. These latter organisations will add their  
risk premium to the interest rate set by the NMB according to the payment risk that different households  
represent. They will also set up a time table with their client to see how the long term loan will be repaid.  
The banks and building societies will provide a guarantee to the NMB for the servicing of the mortgage 
loans taken out by their customers through NMB funding. Banks and building societies would also do well to 
require their mortgage customers to have their salary account with the lending bank/society, so that they can 
follow income developments of their client. If a client wishes to move the mortgage to a different bank, the 
salary  account  should  preferably  move  with  it.  Credit  monitoring  should  remain  the  role  of  the 
banks/societies.
Variant 2 All funding and credit risks taken by NMB, but mortgage credit proposals and payment  
flows through banks and building societies
Variant 2 is the way both Fannie Mae and Freddy Mac operate. However in 2008 both entities had to be  
rescued by the U.S government due to the credit risk performance of individual households. In the period to  
2008 these two entities had -just like some American banks- lowered their risk rating standards and had  
gotten involved in sub-prime mortgages. In the U.K. -contrary to the U.S experience-, commercial banks  
have  helped  their  customers,  whenever  possible,  through  changing  the  terms  of  the  mortgage  from 
repayment  to interest  only mortgages.  Due to this forbearance,  the U.K level of  repossessed homes has  
stayed relatively stable.  In  the  U.S the securitisation of  mortgage  loans was widely practised and such  
indirect funders had no other option than to move from what should have stayed as an income related loan 
facility to the asset liquidation -the sales of the underlying asset: the homes-. Forbearance is helpful at low 
interest  rates,  but  problems will  arise  when interest  rates  start  to  rise.  Also the short  term incentive as  
provided in the Funding for Lending programme stores up a similar problem for the future.
My choice would be for Variant 1. This leaves banks and building societies to take income risks on their  
clients, but no interest rate risks. Individual households will have the benefit of a fixed mortgage rate, rather  
than the vagaries of fluctuating rates.
The technicalities of the funding process for the NMB could be similar to the way both Fannie Mae and 
Freddy Mac raise funds out of the money and capital markets. Of course banks and building societies as well  
as pension funds and individual investors could participate in these fund raising exercises.
Both Fannie  Mae and Freddy Mac have private shareholders.  In  my view NMB should be a  collective 
enterprise  and therefore  the  ownership should be all  individual  households  together,  represented by the  
Government. An initial equity capital injection could come from the Government or the Bank of England, 
but in case the NMB turns in a profit this should not be distributed but added to the reserves of the Mortgage  
Bank.  Its  liabilities would not  constitute a government  debt  as the loans would not  have been used for  
government expenditure.
The National Mortgage Insurance Company
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Adverse life events will have an effect on the payment performance of some customers. The aim of the NMI  
is to cover these effects to the extent that they are not self inflicted. Such protection is especially essential for  
the lower and median income classes. Nearly all of them have to rely fully on their own employment income  
and do not posses large sums of available cash other than the amounts accumulated in their pension pots. 
The NMI can also help first time buyers by insuring the first 10 or 15% of the mortgage loan after say a 5% 
or 10% down payment was made. The remainder 80% would remain the risk of the lending bank. Once  
individual households have reached the 20% equity, the policy would stop to be effective.  The NMI can act  
as a catalyst as well as a brake in the number of home mortgages granted, by temporarily changing the risks 
it underwrites when mortgage levels grow too slowly or too fast.
The equity pattern for the NMI can follow the pattern of the NMB.
5.2.2 Income risks related to companies
One of the most substantial risks for companies is to create a production capacity larger than the demand  
levels. This applies for each individual company, but also for all companies combined in the U.K. An export 
drive may help to relieve some of the pressure, but most of the total demand in nearly all countries comes  
from domestic sources: this also applies to the U.K. 
If  an output  gap occurs,  the reaction by companies is  either to lay of staff,  keep them on but  increase  
remuneration less than inflation levels -often through their own company price levels- or in the worst case go 
out of business. Another reaction is to spend less on new plant and equipment. Shareholders will feel the 
pinch as profits will be adversely affected. Jobs, incomes, profits and non-financial assets (investments in 
physical goods) will be affected. The multiplier effect will spread throughout the economy and affect the  
banking sector and the government’s income as well.
As indicated in the introduction an output gap is created by the company sector, but a lack in demand can 
also be caused by an income gap. In this situation individual households cannot spend their way out of an  
economic crisis as they do not earn enough, especially compared to inflation levels. My conclusion out of 
current data is that the current U.K economic slow growth period is based on the income gap scenario. An  
efficient way to adjust the U.K.’s economy is to help individual households to increase spending, not by  
borrowing more, but by giving them access -on a temporary basis- to some of their savings.
In 5.2.1 a possible solution to maintaining a sustainable level of home building has been suggested. This will 
help, but cannot be the only solution.
In the introduction to Section 5, two concepts were introduced simultaneously:  (i) reduce the risks to all  
households  and (ii)  use  existing savings more  efficiently.  In  proposal  2  these concepts  have been used 
together for helping to solve the macro-economic risk of an output gap for all companies combined.
To start with the savings level: U.K. pension funds’ assets reached £1.7 trillion by the end of 2012 according  
to Pensions World19. This was 109.8% of the total U.K’s GDP in 2012.  These pension funds’ assets grew by 
5% over 2012. This is in sharp contrast as to what happened in the real economy. The IMF’s forecast for  
U.K.’s economic growth in 2012 was for -0.4% real output growth.
What these data show for the U.K. is that the amount of “locked up” savings of individual households can 
constitute a potential hazard to economic growth. According to the OECD Pensions Outlook 2012 20 U.K 
pension funds allocated their resources as follows in 2010: Cash and deposits 2.8%, government bills and  
bonds 11%, private sector bonds 9.3%, loans 1.1%, shares 22%, land and buildings 2.3%, mutual  funds  
28.7% and unallocated  and other  resources  22.8%.  The aim of  pension  funds  is  to  accumulate  enough 
19 http://www.pensionsworld.co.uk/pw/article/uk-pension-fund-assets-at-%C2%A317-trillion-hit-record-high-12323301
20 http://www.oecd.org/finance/privatepensions/oecdpensionsoutlook2012.htm
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resources during the working life of an individual, to allow a decent pension income over the retirement life  
of the individual, which in the U.K. is an average pension period of 18 years for men and 20.6 years for 
women from the age of 65.
What the allocation of pension funds’ resources show is that nearly all of the investments are in financial  
assets invested in the government and in the private sector companies in one way or another. What one can 
also deduce is that only a very small proportion of the assets is being paid out to retired people in a current  
year, so as to preserve enough reserves to pay for the remainder years. The conclusion is that the income 
flow out of the total pension assets used for current consumption represents only a very small percentage of 
the total accumulated savings. If a pension fund has an age distribution build up equally spread over the  
years of contribution and over the retirement years than the contributors will always pay in more than the 
benefits paid out. If pension funds subsequently have a positive return over their funds under management,  
than these pension fund save far more than they spend on current consumption. On the whole in the U.K and 
in most countries pension funds are net savings institutions. In weak economic times they constitute a drain  
on spending. Under current legislation, pension funds cannot accelerate or decelerate consumer demand. 
This leads to my second proposal: Economic Easing.
Proposal 2 Economic Easing
Economic easing is the action by pension funds to pay out a temporary cash dividend to its pension savers  
and pensioners at times of underutilisation of the labour force and underutilisation of the production capacity 
of the company sector. It would particularly be helpful as a tool to be used at times when the average wages  
growth does not keep up with inflation.
There are four aspects to economic easing:
• The first aspect is that it is a temporary measure to shore up demand levels until the time that full  
employment, full capacity utilisation and disposable income levels able to follow inflation levels are 
reached. It can be started up and stopped much quicker than government infrastructure projects.
• The second aspect is that using savings to enhance consumption levels improve not only company  
profits but also share prices. It also improves the level and the quality of jobs available. Economic 
easing will increase the potential contributors to pension funds and last but not least it also improves 
government  deficits,  allowing pension funds to allocate more  of their  resources to the company 
sector.
• The third aspect is that allowing pension funds to engage in economic easing is to help them enhance  
their own performance over the financial assets. There is however the risk that it might not work  
quickly, so that a protracted injection is needed. For this the government, on behalf of all individual 
households, could step in and guarantee that the reward for participating in economic easing should 
work out to no less than the index linked gilts.
• The fourth aspect is that economic easing uses funds which are owned by individual households. 
They have already saved such funds in past periods. This represents a fundamental difference with a  
government Keynesian injection of funds. The latter is based on borrowed funds from, among others, 
the pension funds. Individual households will ultimately be required to pay back such funds, which 
is not the case in economic easing.
What would be an appropriate dividend? My estimate is that about 1.5% to 2% of the accumulated pension  
savings would be enough. This would be a demand injection of 1.6% to 2.2% of GDP if the whole injection 
is turned into consumer demand, which the government should request the individual households to do. Such 
injection will unleash company investments in expanding production facilities, especially if companies could 
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be certain that that such cash injections -from individual households’ own savings- will continue till the goal 
of full employment etc. has been achieved.
The distribution over the pension savers and beneficiaries is made difficult by the precise number of pension 
savers and retirees drawing a private pension. For U.K. the number of participants in DC and DB schemes 
combined with the  number  of beneficiaries will  probably add up to 10 million individuals.  If  an equal  
amount would be distributed to all these individuals it would amount to £2,500 till £3,400 per person. The 
effectiveness of such cash injection would be enhanced if the tax over this cash injection would be waived  
and if the payments would be spread out over four quarterly injections. Indirectly the government would  
benefit greatly from this action. The equal amount principle helps the younger members more, but they run 
the longest investment risks.
Pension funds will see their client base rapidly expanded if there are chances of a pension dividend when 
times are tough. This will reduce the pressure on the U.K. government to provide for a basic state pension.
5.2.3 Income risks related to banks
As indicated in the above, banks are different from companies in that in an economic down turn, banks only 
have the option to reduce new lending, but they cannot get out of their current portfolios of risks. They also  
cannot reduce their main input costs -their costs of funds-. Their individual choice was the client base with  
which they do business. Banks have little power over the state of an economy.
Northern Rock did not get into trouble because it had long term mortgages outstanding, notwithstanding that  
it was one of the most aggressive mortgage lenders. It got into trouble because it had securitised a very  
sizeable share of its mortgage portfolio and placed these via Special Purpose Vehicles with outside investors. 
When the latter  -as  a  consequence  of  the  U.S.  subprime  debacle-  did  not  want  to  renew their  funding 
commitments, Northern Rock ran out of funds. It only funded about 25% of its mortgage portfolio from its  
own depositors. HBOS had to be rescued not because it ran out of funds, but Bank of Scotland’s corporate 
arm was known in the market as the most aggressive lender. It fell foul of non-performing loans. RBS would 
most likely have survived without government support, if it had financed its acquisition with the issuance of  
shares -as Barclays had offered-. It did not and it paid cash at the top of the market for ABN AMRO Bank. It  
simultaneously acted as the lead bank for two other banks, as it could not afford the take over on its own.
Securitisation -in effect funding structure- errors, lending errors and managerial errors were responsible for  
the British bank crashes. None of these errors had anything to do with casino banking, unless the RBS action 
should be classified as such.
Would the U.K. bank crashes have been avoided if the investment banking arms had been electrified and ring 
fenced? Not in the case of Northern Rock; its funding structure was to blame. Not in the case of HBOS, its  
aggressive lending stance was to blame, which was applied at the wrong time. Not in the case of RBS as it  
needed the Financial Services Authority’s approval for its take over action.
This is not to say that the Lehman Brothers, AIG and other financial organisations were not responsible for  
the ultimate crash, which was the crash in the mortgage backed securities. One should take into account that  
years before the collapse, the collective of U.S. lending banks had dramatically lowered their risk taking  
standards on mortgages. However, the lending banks were happy in doing so as the investment banks, with  
the help of the rating agencies, were able to offload these risks to the investing public around the world. It is  
also not to say that “risk trading” for own account and for servicing the financial markets has now been made  
so complex that few bank managers understand the risks they are exposed too.
Bank  risks  start  with  individual  households  and  companies.  Lowering  such  risks  through  setting  up  a 
National Mortgage Bank and Insurance Company or through applying Economic Easing can potentially take  
away major risk factors to the banking sector. If such risks are mitigated, the opportunity to speculate and 
make profits out of fluctuations will also diminish.
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There are also other ways to make banks behave in a responsible manner. This is our proposal 3.
Proposal 3 A Revised Bank Risk Management Structure
When  bank  regulators  consider  changing  the  operating  rules  for  banks,  they  focus  strongly  but  not  
exclusively on bank solvency. Solvency reflects the assets and liabilities of a bank, its balance sheet. The  
start of this section stated already that banks are different from companies. This is most clearly shown in the 
flexibility companies have when sales are below or are expected to be below the planned level. They can cut  
expenses on staff, raw materials and intermediate goods and sometimes reduce borrowings and or even save  
some cash.
Lending banks’ main  expense is  the  interest  expense,  as they are highly geared operations.  Their  main  
income is  interest  income  over  loans.  This  interest  income  is  influenced by doubtful  debtors’  not  fully 
returning interest and principal. This is similar to a company selling an item at a price, but only receiving  
part of the price.  For banks such reduced cash flow might  happen years after the loan was made.  The  
conclusion is that banks are income -cash flow- based companies rather asset based ones. They do not know 
from the outset what “price” they will receive over the risks taken.
At a British Bankers’ Conference held in October last year the Deputy Governor of the Bank of England was 
quoted as stating that “doubtful debtor accounting are holding banks back”21.
My proposal is in line with this thinking. The proposal is:
Change bank risk accounting standards
Allow banks to make provisions for doubtful debtors from the moment they enter into loan contracts, be it a  
mortgage, a consumer loan, a corporate loan, or corporate or government bond. Banks know or should know 
from experience what the payment performance is among their chosen client base. They should anticipate the  
risks; which means the potential provisions to be made. Allow banks to foresee the write-offs and the period 
over which such provisions should be made, which in any case should be shorter than the lending period. 
Once a bank has decided on the potential write-offs, they should be fixed in the accounting ledger. Only the  
amounts entered at the time of entering into the loan agreement or bond purchase should be recognised for 
tax  deductibility.  If  actual  write  offs  would  turn  out  to  be  more,  such  extra  loss  should  come  out  of  
shareholders funds and not from the taxpayers. If actual write offs turn out to be less than anticipated, this 
constitutes a bank profit and corporate tax rates would be levied.
Banks do not need equity capital related to categories of risks that banking supervisors decide for them. 
Leave it to the bank involved; leave it to the managements whose job it is to assess risks. They should know 
their clients. However banks need buffer funds and such buffer funds could be perpetual notes rather than  
equity capital. The difference is that the perpetual note holder gets a fixed amount of interest per annum. If  
banks pay interest over such notes, it means that all classes of money depositors get paid for providing the 
banks with different classes of risk money. In case banks have not set aside enough risk provision money out  
of their income, the losses are reflected in a value write down of the perpetual notes, which are listed on the  
stock markets. If banks have over provided, such income after tax may occasionally be distributed over the 
perpetual notes holders.
In this set up all money providers to banks are regularly paid for their risks in the banking business. Sound  
risk judgments lead to adequate up-front provisions and the profits made are not distorted by insufficient  
provisioning.  Conservative and well  managed banks will  gain at  the expense of aggressive risk seeking 
banks. Too low a provisioning level will punish perpetual note holders.  Bankers’ bonuses should be paid out 
on a deferral basis and after perpetual note holders have been paid.  Good bank managers should be rewarded 
and poor managements will have to forego their bonuses before perpetual not holders are affected. In any 
21 http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/blog/2012/oct/17/accounting-rules-banking-valuations
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case the markets can follow which banks are the healthy ones. Under current accounting rules, they have not 
got a clue.
In the  categories  of  risk taking,  all  types  of investment  banking activities  should also be included.  For 
instance own account trading requires at least a fifty percent provisioning; some derivatives trading also a 
higher percentage than individual household loans or corporate loans. Mergers and acquisitions require a  
better level of provisioning; so do stock market introductions. Again the more conservative banks will win it  
from the aggressive banks as too low provisioning is punished by not being tax deductible. In the latter case, 
this means that more perpetual notes will be needed to keep up the banking buffer. The markets will know  
which bank has acted most prudently with customers’ monies.
In the manner set out above, conservative banks will put their clients’ interest first and bankers’ rewards 
second. Aggressive banks will need to convince the markets that they need increasing amounts of perpetual 
notes  in  order  to  survive.  The  rewards  and brakes  are  built  in  into  the  revised  bank risk  management  
structure.
5.2.4 Income risks related to the Bank of England
Individual  households  have no say over the setting of interest  rates for  longer  term government  bonds.  
However if one would ask them which type of government bond they would like the most, their most likely 
reply would be to have inflation related indexed linked government bonds. These are the same bonds which 
in 2011 constituted 94.8% of the pension reserves of the pension fund of the Bank of England.22 In the U.K 
such bonds have done outstandingly well from an income point of view and so has the pension fund of the  
Bank of England. For pension funds, such rewards are essential in ensuring that pension reserves are in line 
with index linked pay-outs.
However  what  individual  households  -and their  representative  financial  organisations  as  pension  funds, 
mutual  funds  and  banks-  are  currently  faced  with  is  that  inflation  levels  outstrip  10  year  and  shorter  
government bond yield levels. This is the case for the U.K., the U.S., and for Germany and other Northern  
European countries. Japan has a slightly positive yield margin over inflation. U.K. gilts represent an income 
flow and a financial asset for the holders of such bonds. 
By buying up gilts through quantitative easing exercises, the Bank of England did not reduce the risks to  
individual households but they did change the price and the reward over the bonds. The Bank of England has 
bought up £375 billion out of a total government debt level of slightly over £1 trillion. By the Bank’s own  
admission it has increased inflation levels by about 1%. The current 10 year gilt yield is 1.84% and the 
current inflation level is 2.70%, a negative 86 basis points carry. Index linked gilts represent about 20% of 
the total gilt market.
 
The bond buying practice increases the so-called market value of existing fixed rate bonds. This leads to  
profit levels which are unreal, as they are the effect of the central bank’s actions. An article in the U.K Daily  
Telegraph of 31st December 2012 assessed that “the real winners of the QE programmes have been the hedge 
fund managers and that those relying on interest income have suffered; especially the savers and pensioners.”
Rather than imposing long term interest rates which do not keep pace with inflation levels, I propose to turn 
QE into QS, which stands for Quantitative Strengthening.
Proposal 4 Quantitative Strengthening
My proposal is to change the composition of the U.K. government debt gradually from 20% in index linked 
gilts to 80% in index linked debt. In this manner pension funds, but also banks and all other investors have a 
chance,  to  earn  a  return above  inflation  levels,  just  like  the  Bank of  England’s  own pension  fund has 
practised over the last few years.  The U.K. Debt Management Office has already announced that it had 
22 http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/about/Documents/humanresources/pensionupdate.pdf
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requests for a higher level of index linked gilts. QS can also be made effective by swapping the £375 billion  
the Bank of England holds in fixed rate gilts into index linked gilts. The latter gilts can gradually be released 
back into the markets. Of course, all government debt needs to be repaid in due course by all individual  
households, but using QS will help to create an asset class of outstanding credit quality which is inflation  
linked. This method will also reinforce the importance for the Bank of England to follow monetary policies, 
which contain inflation at 2% or below.
5.2.5 The U.K. Government
The U.K. government in its tax revenues is depending on the private sector to return to growth. It is already 
taking  steps  to  curb  its  expenditure  levels.  What  is  often  suggested  is  to  invest  more  in  infrastructure  
projects, like new airports or railways. Such projects are either necessary or not, but if so, they take a very 
long time to implement and such projects are therefore not suitable for short term economic remedies. They 
cannot be stopped when the economy is at full swing. They should be undertaken on their own merits as and  
when the long term economic justification is adequate. If companies can get their short term projections 
wrong, a government can only hope that it can get its long term projections right. There are no certainties.  
What is certain is that political factors play a much greater role in infrastructure projects than they do in  
private sector businesses. Spending other peoples’ money is somewhat easier than one’s own.
Apart from the government taking the lead and coordinating in getting all parties at the table to agree to an  
Economic Growth Pact,  the government’s  budget  situation seems unlikely to allow itself  any additional 
Keynesian injection, further than it already had to execute.
5.2.6 The U.K. pension funds.
With £1.7 trillion in assets, collectively U.K. pension funds manage more savings than the U.K. banking 
sector. The latter had £1.25 trillion in currency and deposits as per the end of 2011. The four proposals as 
mentioned above: The National Mortgage Bank and the National Mortgage Insurance Company; Economic 
Easing; Changes in Bank Accounting Standards and Quantitative Strengthening will all help to get the U.K.  
economy to grow. As a result the investment performance of pension funds should see the positive effects 
from such actions and the confidence of saving for a private pension should get a substantial boost.
One element needs mentioning in this regard. If,  just like the pension fund of the Bank of England, all  
investments would be placed in index linked gilts, longevity factors would still require that a discount rate is  
applied to all future pension commitments. For the Bank of England’s pension fund a 3% discount factor was 
used. Why: Because discounting cannot be done with the help of uncertain future returns over inflation levels 
which themselves are also uncertain. Notwithstanding the great actuarial insights in longevity factors, the 
needed level of provision for old age cannot be an accurate science, even if all investments outstrip inflation 
levels. There will always be some risks.
Drs C.J. de Koning
Chorleywood WD3 5NX
14th February 2013
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